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Pro se litigants face a number of challenges when bringing civil litigation. One
potential solution to these challenges, endorsed by members of the judiciary and the
legal academy, is pro se reform at the trial court level: offering special services to pro
se litigants in order to help them successfully navigate the legal system. This
Comment offers the first publicly available empirical assessment of several pro se
reform efforts thus far. The analysis shows that these pro se reforms have not succeeded in improving pro se litigants’ win rates at trial. This Comment thus suggests
that, while pro se reforms likely have important merits, such as enabling a more
thorough and dignified hearing process for pro se litigants, on average these reforms
do not alter the final outcomes of the litigation process.
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INTRODUCTION
In September 2017, Judge Richard Posner abruptly resigned
from the Seventh Circuit. In subsequent interviews, Posner explained that he resigned in part because of his disagreement with
his judicial colleagues over the Seventh Circuit’s treatment of pro
se litigants (those litigants who appear before courts without lawyers).1 In particular, Posner thought the court wasn’t “treating
the pro se appellants fairly,” didn’t “like the pro se’s,” and generally didn’t “want to do anything with them.”2
Posner’s resignation is a powerful reminder of the challenges
pro se litigants continue to face. His belief that pro se litigants
are frequently mistreated in civil litigation and denied a full and
fair opportunity to vindicate their claims is neither new nor limited to federal appellate courts.3 Numerous legal commentators
have expressed similar concerns.4 Yet, though the belief that pro
se litigants are underserved by the legal community is widespread, the full extent of the challenges they face in court is still
only partially understood.
At the same time, there has been considerable consternation
over the growing volume of judicial and legal resources consumed

1
See David Lat, The Backstory behind Judge Richard Posner’s Retirement (Above
the Law, Sept 7, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/AW74-5TQ6.
2
Id.
3
Many commentators share the same concerns about indigent criminal defendants.
However, because criminal defendants are guaranteed access to counsel, they face a somewhat different set of challenges than pro se civil litigants and are not the focus of the
analysis of this Comment. For one critical discussion of the treatment of indigent criminal
defendants, see generally Stephen B. Bright, Legal Representation for the Poor: Can Society Afford This Much Injustice?, 75 Mo L Rev 683 (2010). But see J. Harvie Wilkinson III,
In Defense of American Criminal Justice, 67 Vand L Rev 1099, 1127–29 (2014) (arguing
that representation of criminal indigent defendants is generally of high quality).
4
See generally, for example, Donald H. Zeigler and Michele G. Hermann, The Invisible Litigant: An Inside View of Pro Se Actions in the Federal Courts, 47 NYU L Rev 157
(1972) (highlighting problems and difficulties for pro se litigants throughout the litigation
process); Thomas L. Eovaldi and Peter R. Meyers, The Pro Se Small Claims Court in
Chicago: Justice for the “Little Guy”?, 72 Nw U L Rev 947 (1978) (discussing deficiencies
of pro se small claims courts). See also Margaret Martin Barry, Accessing Justice: Are Pro
Se Clinics a Reasonable Response to the Lack of Pro Bono Legal Services and Should Law
School Clinics Conduct Them?, 67 Fordham L Rev 1879, 1926 (1999) (describing the pro
se system as one that “sacrifices justice for expediency”).
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by pro se litigants.5 Many pro se litigants bring dubious claims.6
Time and energy expended on these claims is time and energy
that cannot be expended on other legal issues.
Any reform must simultaneously balance a number of key
policy goals: it should ensure the ability of pro se litigants to receive fair trials without unfairly disadvantaging their adversaries, allocate sufficient resources to ensure quick and fair hearings while avoiding overdrawing on judicial and legal resources
that might instead be put to more urgent needs,7 and be practicable within the Supreme Court’s current jurisprudence and the
statutory authority granted to courts by Congress.
A number of commentators have trumpeted reforms at the
trial court level geared toward assisting pro se litigants as a possible solution.8 These reforms usually aim to give pro se litigants
access to resources and information that can help them successfully navigate the legal process, reduce their costs, or provide
them with assistance from courts’ offices.9 Examples of reforms
that have been implemented include providing pro se litigants
with access to electronic filing systems that make it easier to file
lawsuits and monitor proceedings, allowing pro se litigants to
communicate with law clerks about their claims and proceedings,
5
See generally, for example, Committee on Federal Courts of the New York State
Bar Association, Pro Se Litigation in the Second Circuit, 62 St John’s L Rev 571 (1988)
(suggesting solutions to combat an exploding pro se docket); Benjamin H. Barton and
Stephanos Bibas, Triaging Appointed-Counsel Funding and Pro Se Access to Justice, 160
U Pa L Rev 967 (2012) (arguing that there are more cost-efficient approaches to improving
pro se litigation than a constitutional right to counsel in civil cases because of the considerable resources that it would require).
6
The Supreme Court has indicated awareness of this issue. See Neitzke v Williams,
490 US 319, 326 (1989) (noting “the problems in judicial administration caused by the
surfeit of meritless in forma pauperis complaints in the federal courts, not the least of
which is the possibility that meritorious complaints will receive inadequate attention or
be difficult to identify amidst the overwhelming number of meritless complaints”).
7
At least some commentators have expressed concern that allocating more legal
resources to pro se civil litigants might take away from resources needed for indigent criminal defense. See Barton and Bibas, 160 U Pa L Rev at 980–81 (cited in note 5). It is important, however, to recognize that legal resources also may trade off with nonlegal resources, and an analysis accounting for these trade-offs may make the economics of
expanded legal resources for pro se litigants look more attractive. Additional money spent
on lawyers or pro se assistance might be more economical than it first appears if, for example, additional state spending in an eviction or wrongful termination proceeding saves
the government from paying for homeless shelters or welfare assistance at a later date.
8
See, for example, note 60 and accompanying text.
9
See generally Jessica K. Steinberg, Demand Side Reform in the Poor People’s
Court, 47 Conn L Rev 741 (2015) (arguing for “demand side” procedural and judicial reform
to assist pro se litigants as opposed to the “supply side” reform of simply providing counsel
to pro se litigants); Barton and Bibas, 160 U Pa L Rev 967 (cited in note 5).
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and publicly disseminating information about resources that may
be available to pro se litigants through the court or third parties.10
Critically, these reforms can be implemented by the trial courts
and their staff and do not require significant additional contributions from attorneys, clinics, or other legal institutions. Accordingly, these programs can help pro se litigants without diverting
legal resources away from other causes, including indigent criminal defense. A large number of federal district courts have already implemented at least some of these procedural reforms
aimed at helping pro se litigants.11
This Comment furthers the legal community’s understanding
of issues in pro se litigation by conducting an empirical analysis
of pro se reforms in federal district courts. By comparing case outcomes for pro se litigants in district courts that have implemented
these types of reforms with the outcomes of similarly situated pro
se litigants in courts that have not implemented any reforms, this
Comment provides an initial assessment of the impact of those
reforms. The analysis reveals that thus far, a wide range of reforms undertaken by federal district courts have not significantly
impacted case outcomes for pro se litigants. This analysis conflicts with the intuitions of the Supreme Court, commentators,
and judges and clerks of district court offices, who have indicated
their belief that these reforms are effective.
Importantly, this Comment does not suggest that these reforms have been failures. These reforms may have improved the
pro se litigation process by making it feel more humane and easier to understand and by giving litigants a stronger sense that
their concerns have been heard. Moreover, these reforms may still
ease the burden of pro se litigation on courts by helping courts
understand the issues involved more clearly or by moving cases
through the judicial system more quickly. The analysis does suggest, however, that district court reforms have been ineffective in
improving case outcomes for pro se litigants, and alternative approaches should be considered.
Accordingly, this Comment suggests that pro se trial court
reform is not the silver bullet that some commentators have
hoped for in the quest to remedy the shortcomings of the pro se
10

For more discussion, see Part I.C.
See Donna Stienstra, Jared Bataillon, and Jason A. Cantone, Assistance to Pro Se
Litigants in U.S. District Courts: A Report on Surveys of Clerks of Court and Chief Judges
*3 (Federal Judicial Center, 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/8TYT-7Y43 (reporting that
90 percent of the US district courts surveyed have adopted at least one procedural reform).
11
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litigation process. In order to meaningfully improve case outcomes for pro se litigants, the legal community will either need to
implement different and potentially more dramatic reforms than
those implemented thus far or consider another approach altogether, such as renewed advocacy for “civil Gideon.”12 Alternatively, it is also possible that there is no cost-effective way to improve case outcomes for civil pro se litigants in the context of the
modern US legal system. This Comment does not analyze the
merits of these options. Instead, it strongly suggests that a different solution is needed to ensure pro se litigants get a full and
equal opportunity to have their claims redressed via litigation.
This Comment proceeds as follows. Part I provides an introduction to relevant case law, as well as key perspectives in the
academy, on the rights of pro se litigants and procedural safeguards to protect pro se litigants. Part II presents an empirical
overview of pro se litigation in federal district courts and contextualizes the typical types and outcomes of pro se litigation within
the context of the federal docket. Part III details some of the policies that federal district courts have implemented thus far to improve the results of pro se litigation by comparing pro se outcomes
in courts that have implemented those reforms with pro se outcomes in courts that have not implemented those reforms, and it
demonstrates that those measures have not impacted case outcomes. Part IV then describes and analyzes the effects of wholesale reforms to the pro se litigation process in the Eastern District
of New York (EDNY) by comparing case outcomes for pro se litigants in EDNY with those of neighboring districts before and after the implementation of reforms. Part IV bolsters the findings
of Part III by showing that EDNY’s wholesale pro se reform also
did not impact the win rates of pro se litigants. Part V discusses
some of the implications of the results detailed in Parts III and
IV, and the Conclusion summarizes the contribution of this
Comment and identifies some opportunities for future research.
I. THE RIGHTS OF CIVIL PRO SE LITIGANTS
There is limited Supreme Court jurisprudence on trial-court
reforms for civil pro se litigants. However, an extensive body of

12 Civil Gideon refers generally to the movement to provide legal counsel to lowincome persons in various civil legal proceedings. For more discussion about the contours
of this movement, see Part I.B.
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case law establishes the right to counsel for indigent criminal litigants and then denies that right to civil litigants who cannot afford counsel. Moreover, in one recent case, Turner v Rogers,13 the
Supreme Court established a limited right to procedural protections for civil pro se litigants, creating the potential for new jurisprudence establishing new rights for civil pro se litigants.14
A.

Case Law on the Rights of Pro Se Litigants at Trial

Over the past hundred years, unrepresented litigants have
brought numerous lawsuits to determine the extent to which the
Constitution guarantees the right to counsel, mostly focusing on
the textual guarantees in the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments.15 The Sixth Amendment famously states that, “[i]n
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to . . .
the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”16 The Supreme Court
has clarified the scope of the right to counsel in criminal prosecutions through a series of landmark cases, gradually converting a
guaranteed right to provide one’s own counsel into a right to
government-provided counsel whenever a criminal defendant is
unable to procure counsel.17 However, the Supreme Court has
taken a much narrower view of the right to counsel, and legal protections more generally, for pro se litigants in civil cases.18
From the 1930s through the 1970s, the Supreme Court gradually strengthened the right to counsel in criminal prosecutions
in a series of landmark decisions. Ultimately, this led to the
Supreme Court’s current position: defendants have the right to
counsel in essentially all criminal prosecutions.19 The first key
13

564 US 431 (2011).
See notes 41–45 and accompanying text.
15 “Right to counsel” in this Comment refers to a litigant’s right to have an attorney
provided if the litigant is unable to afford a lawyer. In other contexts, it is sometimes
defined more narrowly, such as a right to a lawyer only in the case of criminal defense or
a right to a lawyer only if a litigant can afford his or her own lawyer. See generally, Note,
The Indigent’s Right to Counsel in Civil Cases, 76 Yale L J 545 (1967).
16 US Const Amend VI.
17 See John D. King, Beyond “Life and Liberty”: The Evolving Right to Counsel,
48 Harv CR–CL L Rev 1, 6–15 (2013) (discussing the historic evolution of the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel).
18 See, for example, Gagnon v Scarpelli, 411 US 778, 789 (1973) (discussing how
differences between criminal trials and civil proceedings, such as lack of a state prosecutor
and less formal procedure, eliminate the need for a categorical guarantee of a right to
counsel for defendants in some civil proceedings even when a loss might lead to their
incarceration).
19 See Argersinger v Hamlin, 407 US 25, 40 (1972) (holding that, “[u]nder the rule
we announce today, every judge will know when the trial of a misdemeanor starts that no
14
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case in this series was Powell v Alabama.20 In Powell, the
Supreme Court held for the first time that the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment requires states to respect the right
to counsel in at least some criminal trials.21 Under Powell, the
right to adequate counsel was guaranteed only for capital cases.
The Court explicitly declined to reach the question of whether
states needed to provide a similar guarantee of access to counsel
in noncapital cases.22
Over the next thirty years, the Supreme Court slowly expanded the right to counsel for criminal defendants. Shortly after
Powell, in Johnson v Zerbst,23 the Supreme Court held that the
Sixth Amendment protects the right to counsel for all criminal
defendants in federal courts.24 Additionally, the Court held that,
when the accused “is not represented by counsel and has not competently and intelligently waived his constitutional right” to
counsel, any criminal conviction will be ruled unconstitutional as
a Sixth Amendment violation.25 The Supreme Court initially declined to extend Zerbst to all criminal cases in state courts, instead reaffirming, as it held in Powell, that the right to counsel
was guaranteed only in capital cases in state courts. In Betts v
Brady,26 the Court declined to overturn a robbery conviction even
though the trial court had refused the defendant’s request for the
assistance of counsel, holding that states were not constitutionally mandated to provide adequate counsel for state trials in noncapital cases.27
In 1963, the Supreme Court broke from precedent and found
the right to counsel to be a “fundamental safeguard[ ] of liberty”

imprisonment may be imposed, even though local law permits it, unless the accused is
represented by counsel”).
20 287 US 45 (1932).
21 Id at 56–61.
22 See id at 71:
Whether this would be so in other criminal prosecutions, or under other circumstances, we need not determine. All that it is necessary now to decide, as we do
decide, is that in a capital case . . . it is the duty of the court, whether requested
or not, to assign counsel for him as a necessary requisite of due process of law.
23

304 US 458 (1938).
Id at 463.
25 Id at 468.
26 316 US 455 (1942).
27 Id at 473 (“[W]e cannot say that the [Fourteenth] Amendment embodies an inexorable command that no trial for any offense, or in any court, can be fairly conducted and
justice accorded a defendant who is not represented by counsel.”).
24
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guaranteed to all criminal defendants by the Constitution.28 In
the landmark case Gideon v Wainwright,29 Clarence Earl Gideon
was charged in Florida state court with breaking and entering
with intent to commit petty larceny.30 Gideon appeared alone in
court and requested a court-appointed attorney to assist his case.
The Florida court declined, as Florida did not provide counsel for
criminal defendants in noncapital cases.31 After granting certiorari,32 the Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause requires states to provide counsel in noncapital criminal cases,
overturning Betts. The Court focused on the “fundamental” nature of the right, comparing it favorably to rights like freedom of
speech and freedom from cruel and unusual punishment, and the
Court held that the Due Process Clause prohibited states from
violating the right.33 This holding, along with its extension to misdemeanors in Argersinger v Hamlin,34 established the modern
right to counsel in all criminal cases.35
Following Gideon, legal activists began a push to extend the
right to counsel into the civil sphere. Advocates argued that the
right to counsel should be extended to civil cases in which the litigants’ essential rights were at stake.36 Those activists have had
limited success; the Supreme Court has declined to find a right to
counsel in civil litigation. In one notable case, Lassiter v
Department of Social Services,37 the appellant argued that failing
to provide counsel in a civil suit that would terminate parental
rights violated the Due Process Clause.38 A 5–4 majority on the
Supreme Court held that there was no general right to appointment of counsel in parental termination proceedings despite the
importance of the right involved. The Court explained that a
litigant’s interest in personal liberty, not the general interests of
28

Gideon v Wainwright, 372 US 335, 341 (1963).
372 US 335 (1963).
30 Id at 336.
31 Id at 337.
32 Famously, Gideon submitted a handwritten petition for certiorari. See generally
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Gideon v Wainwright, No 155 (US filed Jan 5, 1962),
archived at http://perma.cc/EZ34-ZMLZ.
33 Gideon, 372 US at 341–43.
34 407 US 25 (1972).
35 See Gideon, 372 US at 343–45; Argersinger, 407 US at 37 (extending Gideon to
cover misdemeanor, as well as felony, offenses for which imprisionment could be imposed).
36 See Benjamin H. Barton, Against Civil Gideon (and for Pro Se Court Reform), 62
Fla L Rev 1227, 1238–41 (2010) (discussing the post-Gideon wave of civil litigation aimed
toward extending its logic and protections to civil pro se litigants).
37 452 US 18 (1981).
38 Id at 24.
29
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litigants in vindicating legal rights, was the critical question in
determining whether the litigant has a right to counsel.39 Accordingly, in a blow to civil Gideon activists, the Supreme Court held
that there was a “presumption that there is no right to appointed
counsel in the absence of at least a potential deprivation of physical liberty,” signaling the Supreme Court’s reluctance to extend
the right to counsel to civil litigants.40 Lassiter remains good law.
Turner, the most recent Supreme Court ruling on the rights
of civil pro se litigants, threw an unexpected twist into this line of
cases and provided fodder for both proponents and detractors of
the expanded right to counsel for civil litigants. In Turner, all nine
justices agreed that the state was not required to provide counsel
in a civil contempt hearing even if the contempt order would have
resulted in incarceration.41 Nonetheless, a five-justice majority
overturned the sentence, holding that the state must “have in
place alternative procedures that ensure a fundamentally fair determination of the critical incarceration-related question.”42 The
Court highlighted a “set of ‘substitute procedural safeguards’”—
for example, notice about critical issues in the case, the use of
forms to elicit relevant information, and other potential protections—that could stand in for assistance of counsel and ensure
the “‘fundamental fairness’ of the proceeding even where the
State does not pay for counsel for an indigent defendant.”43
Commentators have seen Turner as a complete rejection of
civil Gideon, effectively foreclosing the possibility of an expanded
right to counsel in civil litigation, at least for the foreseeable future.44 However, commentators have also seen the holding in
Turner—that due process requires trial courts to protect pro se
39

Id at 26.
Id at 31.
41 Turner, 564 US at 435. Arguably, this goes even further than Lassiter in denying
the right to counsel for civil litigants; under Lassiter, there arguably should have been a
presumption in favor of the right to appointed counsel because there was a “potential deprivation of physical liberty.” Lassiter, 452 US at 31.
42 Turner, 564 US at 435.
43 Id at 447–48 (citations omitted). Note that safeguards, such as additional forms to
elicit relevant information or additional notice about critical issues, are potentially similar, though not identical, to reforms such as giving pro se litigants access to an electronic
version of the docket or allowing additional communication with a clerk at the court (the
reforms analyzed in Part III).
44 Or at least foreclosing the possibility of the Supreme Court expanding the right to
counsel for civil litigants. See Steinberg, 47 Conn L Rev at 788 (cited in note 9) (noting
that “[t]he court unanimously rejected a guarantee of counsel, greatly disappointing civil
Gideon proponents”); Barton and Bibas, 160 U Pa L Rev at 970 (cited in note 5) (noting
that “Turner dealt the death blow to hopes for a federally imposed civil Gideon”).
40
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litigants’ rights via procedural safeguards—as a nod toward a
new and potentially more fruitful approach to pro se litigation:
reforms in trial courts.45
B.

Commentary and Debate: Civil Gideon

The movement for civil Gideon began shortly after the holding in Gideon established the modern understanding of the right
to counsel in criminal cases.46 Although there is some disagreement among its supporters about the proper breadth of civil
Gideon, the movement has generally focused on providing counsel
for indigent parties in proceedings involving threats to their basic
needs.47 From the movement’s inception, commentators have been
divided over the merits of civil Gideon. Advocates have put forth
a number of arguments in favor of civil Gideon. They have argued
that representation in civil litigation secures constitutional rights
to due process and equal protection of law, is necessary to ensure
fair trials, is “sound social policy,” and helps ensure more consistent outcomes for defendants.48 Critics have countered with
both direct refutations and alternative suggestions. They have argued that Gideon wasn’t that effective in aiding criminal defendants, so civil Gideon would not be either; civil Gideon would be
45 See Steinberg, 47 Conn L Rev at 788 (cited in note 9) (noting that, “in an unanticipated twist, the Court adopted a new due process standard . . . requiring that trial courts
implement ‘substitute procedural safeguards’ for unrepresented parties”); Barton and
Bibas, 160 U Pa L Rev at 970 (cited in note 5) (noting that, “[i]n rejecting a broad new constitutional right, the Court steered toward more sustainable reform for pro se litigants”).
46 See Barton and Bibas, 160 U Pa L Rev at 978 (cited in note 5) (“Calls for a parallel
Gideon right in civil cases followed almost immediately on the heels of Gideon. As early as
1965, an indigent litigant argued [for the provision of counsel in a civil suit].”).
47 See, for example, D. James Greiner, Cassandra Wolos Pattanayak, and Jonathan
Hennessy, The Limits of Unbundled Legal Assistance: A Randomized Study in a
Massachusetts District Court and Prospects for the Future, 126 Harv L Rev 901, 914 n 57
(2013) (discussing a recent American Bar Association (ABA) recommendation to provide
pro bono counsel to civil litigants in cases involving “direct threats to the provisions of
basic human needs, including shelter”). The ABA has also recommended appointed counsel for cases involving sustenance, safety, health, child custody, or removal proceedings,
highlighting the breadth of potential “basic needs” that some advocates believe merit the
appointment of counsel in civil pro se litigation. See, for example, Jaya Ramji-Nogales,
Andrew I. Schoenholtz, and Philip G. Schrag, Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum
Adjudication, 60 Stan L Rev 295, 384 (2007), citing Resolution 112A (American Bar
Association House of Delegates, Aug 7, 2006), archived at http://perma.cc/A98M-RGG3.
48 Andrew Scherer, Why People Who Face Losing Their Homes in Legal Proceedings
Must Have a Right to Counsel, 3 Cardozo Pub L Pol & Ethics J 699, 701–03 (2006). See
also, for example, Ramji-Nogales, Schoenholtz, and Schrag, 60 Stan L Rev at 384 (cited in
note 47). The arguments in these articles focus on civil litigation regarding housing or
immigration, but the arguments hold more generally when a party’s ability to vindicate
important interests is at stake.
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ineffective notwithstanding the effectiveness of Gideon; civil
Gideon would undermine criminal defense by reallocating legal
resources to civil litigation; and, regardless of whether it would
be a good idea, it simply isn’t realistic to expect any judicially created civil Gideon given the current composition of the Supreme
Court.49
Proponents and detractors within the civil Gideon debate disagree on how effective civil Gideon would be in improving case
outcomes for pro se litigants. One reason for this is that commentators disagree about how effective Gideon itself has been at improving case outcomes for criminal defendants.50 Many of the reasons commonly given for the failure of Gideon, such as the
political difficulty of allocating sufficient resources to defense lawyers and the high bar for claiming ineffective assistance of counsel, would likely apply with equal or greater force in the context
of civil Gideon.51
Beyond the difficulties specific to civil Gideon, there is also
empirical uncertainty regarding the value of access to counsel.
Dozens of experimental studies have attempted to shed light on
the effectiveness of attorneys in various settings in aiding
litigants who would otherwise be proceeding pro se.52 One 2010
meta-study conducted on a selection of prior studies suggested
that representation by counsel improved a party’s odds of winning
a suit by a factor between 1.19 and 13.79.53 While those numbers
suggest that access to counsel probably increases a litigant’s odds
49 See, for example, Barton and Bibas, 160 U Pa L Rev at 980 (cited in note 5) (identifying flaws in the arguments of civil Gideon advocates); Barton, 62 Fla L Rev at 1249
(cited in note 36) (describing it as “quite unlikely that the current Court would even take
a civil Gideon case”). See also generally Laura K. Abel, A Right to Counsel in Civil Cases:
Lessons from Gideon v. Wainwright, 15 Temple Political & CR L Rev 527 (2006).
50 For one helpful discussion of how and why the efficacy of Gideon has been doubted,
see Donald A. Dripps, Why Gideon Failed: Politics and Feedback Loops in the Reform of
Criminal Justice, 70 Wash & Lee L Rev 883, 894–99 (2013). But see Wilkinson, 67 Vand
L Rev at 1127–29 (cited in note 3) (arguing that criminal defense lawyers appointed to
represent indigent defendants are typically effective).
51 See Dripps, 70 Wash & Lee L Rev at 895–99 (cited in note 50).
52 For a list of numerous such efforts, see D. James Greiner and Cassandra Wolos
Pattanayak, Randomized Evaluation in Legal Assistance: What Difference Does Representation (Offer and Actual Use) Make?, 121 Yale L J 2118, 2175–79 n 154 (2012).
53 A factor of 1.19 indicates that a represented litigant is 1.19 times more likely to win
than a pro se litigant in the same case. Some of these studies were conducted in different
litigation contexts, and there is no a priori reason to believe that access to counsel has a
similar impact on all types of litigation, so a large range in win ratios like the one seen here
could conceivably be accurate. Still, the gap between a win ratio of 1.19 and 13.79 is sufficiently large to suggest uncertainty in these results. See Rebecca L. Sandefur, The Impact of
Counsel: An Analysis of Empirical Evidence, 9 Seattle J Soc Just 51, 70 (2010).
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of winning a case by at least some margin, the size of the range
limits the value of these studies to policymakers.54 There is also
debate concerning the quality of most of these studies. A 2012
article by Professor D. James Greiner and Cassandra Wolos
Pattanayak looked at dozens of previous studies to quantify the
added value of access to counsel and found almost all of those
studies were unable to accurately measure the effect of access to
counsel.55
However, the few reliable studies conducted thus far tend to
suggest that providing access to counsel significantly improves
outcomes for civil litigants. Greiner and Pattanayak identified
two prior studies that were properly conducted to evaluate the
effects of access to counsel. While noting it was premature to draw
conclusions, they pointed out that one of those studies found that
access to counsel was effective in improving case outcomes, and
the other study found it effective in improving case outcomes in
one of its two experimental settings.56 A follow-up experiment by
Greiner, Pattanayak, and Jonathan Hennessy found that the assistance of counsel led to a significant improvement in litigation
outcomes compared to more piecemeal assistance.57 Specifically,
they found that, from a sample of litigants facing eviction in a
district court, about one-third retained their rental units after receiving unbundled legal assistance—legal aid short of an
attorney-client relationship—whereas approximately two-thirds
retained their units after receiving both unbundled legal assistance and representation by counsel.58 Overall, though the body
of evidence is still limited, the empirical evidence suggests that
providing lawyers for pro se litigants substantially improves case
outcomes for those litigants. Critically, this implies that providing adequate access to counsel may substantially improve case
outcomes for a meaningful percentage of pro se litigants.59

54

See id.
See Greiner and Pattanayak, 121 Yale L J at 2196–98 (cited in note 52).
56 See id at 2197–98.
57 See Greiner, Pattanayak, and Hennessy, 126 Harv L Rev at 919–20 (cited in
note 47).
58 See id at 925–31.
59 However, it is likely premature to express confidence about how these results
would transfer to other types of litigation; it may be the case that access to counsel is
especially effective (or, for that matter, ineffective) at improving case outcomes for pro se
litigants in the housing context.
55
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A Happy Medium? Pro Se Reform in Trial Courts

As the plausibility of civil Gideon has diminished in the wake
of Turner, trial court reforms for pro se litigants have emerged as
a compromise. Both proponents and critics of civil Gideon see major potential benefits of pro se reform: it is a low-cost option that
could conceivably provide meaningful benefits to pro se litigants
without diverting legal resources from more critical cases, it helps
ensure pro se litigants will receive fundamentally fair hearings,
and it is a more politically and jurisprudentially feasible solution
than civil Gideon.60
Some still remain skeptical about pro se reform. Commentators have argued that unfair advantages for pro se litigants correspond to unfair disadvantages for their opponents in civil proceedings, that tweaking the court system specifically for pro se
litigants undermines the rule of law, and that reforms may lead
courts to devote more resources to cases that often prove frivolous.61 Other detractors of trial-court reform for pro se litigants
have opposed it on opposite grounds, arguing that these reforms
may be counterproductive and harm pro se litigants62 or that they
don’t go far enough and that civil Gideon is needed to fully protect
the rights of pro se litigants.63
Unlike civil Gideon advocates, reform advocates have been
successful in implementing pro se reform. A 2011 survey by the
Federal Judicial Center of United States District Courts (“FJC
Survey”) found that eighty-seven of ninety responding districts
60 See generally Barton and Bibas, 160 U Pa L Rev 967 (cited in note 5); Steinberg,
47 Conn L Rev 741 (cited in note 9).
61 See, for example, Drew A. Swank, In Defense of Rules and Roles: The Need to Curb
Extreme Forms of Pro Se Assistance and Accommodation in Litigation, 54 Am U L Rev
1537, 1583–93 (2005) (arguing that, by playing an active role in the litigation process, a
judge becomes an interested party and may become biased—which violates the ideal
American judicial role of a “neutral referee”—and may be unfairly advantaged if they are
excused for procedural mistakes while represented litigants still bear the costs of procedural mistakes their lawyers may make).
62 See, for example, Robert Bacharach and Lyn Entzeroth, Judicial Advocacy in Pro
Se Litigation: A Return to Neutrality, 42 Ind L Rev 19, 34–35 (2009) (arguing that “ad hoc”
rules applied to pro se litigants often end up disadvantaging rather than aiding pro se
litigants, and specifically describing how attempts by judges to help pro se litigants make
initial claims could lead to more dismissals of those claims, thus threatening their pauper
status).
63 As an example, pro se reforms could be counterproductive in a streamlined pro se
office at a district court that consistently suggests dismissing pro se cases before a full
hearing. For a more detailed discussion of entities that have called for civil Gideon rather
than pro se trial court reform, and the contexts in which they have done so, see Greiner,
Pattanayak, and Hennessy, 126 Harv L Rev at 906–07 (cited in note 47).
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had implemented at least one program or procedure to assist pro
se litigants.64 Similar reforms have been undertaken in at least
some state and local courts as well.65
Courts have implemented a number of different programs
and procedures to assist pro se litigants. For example, the 2011
FJC Survey revealed that twenty-five districts allowed pro se law
clerks to directly communicate with pro se litigants about their
cases; thirty-five districts allowed pro se litigants to electronically
access information about the docket sheet, pleadings, and more
through case management/electronic case filing (CM/ECF); nineteen disseminated information about programs for pro se litigants
outside the court, such as in public libraries; and ten provided
software specifically designed to help pro se litigants prepare
their proceedings.66 These types of reforms mirror those suggested
by the Supreme Court in Turner:67 for example, providing notice
to pro se civil litigants of important issues affecting the case and
using forms to solicit relevant information. Likewise, giving access to the docket sheet and pleadings through CM/ECF and allowing communication with a pro se law clerk somewhat fulfills
the Supreme Court’s suggestion to increase efforts to provide pro
se litigants with notice. The pro se software typically helps simplify filing and participation in civil proceedings, similar to forms
that would solicit relevant information.
Courts and commentators appear to believe these reforms
are effective. Chief judges and clerks of courts were asked in the
FJC Survey about the most effective measures for helping
nonprisoner pro se litigants. Tables 1.1 and 1.2, reproduced from
the FJC Survey below, show that both clerks’ offices and chief
judges at district courts believe measures like those discussed
above are effective at improving outcomes for nonprisoner pro se
litigants.68
64 See Stienstra, Bataillon, and Cantone, Assistance to Pro Se Litigants in U.S.
District Courts at *1 (cited in note 11).
65 See Barton and Bibas, 160 U Pa L Rev at 988 (cited in note 5) (noting that civil
courts in San Antonio have been experimenting with pro se reforms).
66 See Stienstra, Bataillon, and Cantone, Assistance to Pro Se Litigants in U.S.
District Courts at *2 (cited in note 11).
67 If anything, district courts have implemented reforms that go beyond those suggested by the Supreme Court; consequently, it seems likely that efforts to meet the
Supreme Court’s criteria would be no more effective than these pro se reforms.
68 Table 1A records the responses of clerks’ offices to the question “What are the most
effective measures your district has implemented to date to help the clerk’s office, prisoner
pro se litigants, and nonprisoner pro se litigants?” under the sections “Measures that help
nonprisoner pro se litigants.” Importantly, this is separated from “Measures that help the
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TABLE 1A: MOST EFFECTIVE MEASURES THAT HELP
NONPRISONER PRO SE LITIGANTS, AS NOTED BY
CLERKS’ OFFICES69
Measures

Number of Mentionsa

Information and guidance tailored to the pro se
litigant (for example, standardized forms,
instructions, or handbooks) and made readily
available (for example, on the web or at a kiosk)
Pro bono program, mediation/settlement
procedures, pro se help centers
E-filing, CM/ECF access
Special staff arrangements or assignments,
staff training, internal reports
Other

48

13
12
12
4

a. There were 66 respondents; they mentioned 89 measures.

TABLE 1B: MOST EFFECTIVE MEASURES USED BY CLERKS’
OFFICES THAT HELP NONPRISONER PRO SE LITIGATION, AS
NOTED BY CHIEF JUDGES70
Measures

Number of Mentionsa

Handbooks; standardized forms; instructions;
other materials

33

Personal assistance by clerk’s office staff and/or
pro se law clerks
Specially designated staff; procedures for
assigning and tracking cases; automation
Other

9
5
2

a. There were 33 respondents; they mentioned 49 measures.

clerk’s office” and “Measures that help prisoner pro se litigants.” The responses to those
latter questions differ meaningfully from the responses concerning measures effective at
helping nonprisoner pro se litigants. The chief judges were similarly asked to separate
measures that helped nonprisoner pro se litigants from measures that helped the court or
prisoner pro se litigants. See Stienstra, Bataillon, and Cantone, Assistance to Pro Se Litigants in U.S. District Courts at *15, 17, 35, 54, 61 (cited in note 11).
69 Table 1A has been reproduced from the FJC Survey, in which it was originally
labeled Table 15. Stienstra, Bataillon, and Cantone, Assistance to Pro Se Litigants in U.S.
District Courts at *17 (cited in note 11).
70 Table 1B has been reproduced from the FJC Survey, in which it was originally
labeled Table 29. Id at *35.
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Tables 1.1 and 1.2 demonstrate that a large proportion of
clerks’ offices and chief judges at district courts believe that pro
se reform measures are helpful to nonprisoner pro se litigants.71
For example, the majority of clerks’ offices surveyed in the FJC
Survey believe that making information and guidance tailored to
pro se litigants readily available is one of the most effective
measures for helping nonprisoner pro se litigants. The vast majority of responding chief judges believe handbooks and standardized materials are helpful, and about 25 percent of chief judges
surveyed believe that personal assistance by the clerk’s office
staff is helpful to pro se litigants. Often, these handbooks and
standardized materials are extensive. For example, the Northern
District of Illinois’s website currently has a thirty-five-page generalized handbook advising pro se litigants72 and specific instructions and forms for how to handle civil rights, employment discrimination, and mortgage foreclosure cases.73
Despite courts’ and commentators’ optimism about these reforms, there has been no publicly available empirical analysis of
the effects of these reforms on case outcomes in pro se litigation
thus far. There is some literature discussing the impacts of pro se
court reforms in a more general sense,74 but that literature does
not focus on the effect on case outcomes. This Comment seeks to
fill that gap by providing an initial analysis of how reforms implemented by courts thus far have impacted case outcomes for pro
se litigants.75
II. EMPIRICAL SUMMARY OF PRO SE LITIGATION
This Part discusses trends in civil pro se litigation in federal
district courts. It examines several important characteristics of
pro se litigation: the volume, typical outcomes, and typical types
71 The questionnaire does not go into further detail about what “helping” nonprisoner
pro se litigants means. Accordingly, it is possible that judges believe these reforms are
helping pro se litigants in ways other than helping them win more cases.
72 See generally Filing a Civil Case without an Attorney: A Guide for the Pro Se Litigant (United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Sept 30, 2016),
archived at http://perma.cc/CGA6-TKR8.
73 See Pro Se Information (United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/P6JD-2WNF.
74 See generally, for example, Lois Bloom and Helen Hershkoff, Federal Courts, Magistrate Judges, and the Pro Se Plaintiff, 16 Notre Dame J L, Ethics & Pub Pol 475 (2002).
75 As discussed elsewhere, this Comment does not purport to claim that impacts on
case outcomes are the only potentially important effect of these reforms nor that the reforms fail by those other metrics. For a more detailed discussion, see Part III.A.
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of suits brought by pro se litigants. It then describes some implications of this data and thus helps contextualize the empirical
analyses of pro se reforms that Parts III and IV present.
A.

Sample

The primary dataset used in this Comment consists of administrative records of civil cases filed in federal district courts, which
are collected and published by the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts (AO).76 The AO dataset includes the district
court in which the case was filed, the docket number of each case,
the date on which the case was filed, the nature of the suit, the
procedural progress of the case at the time the case was disposed
of, the manner in which the case was disposed of, the party that
the final judgment of the case was in favor of, and whether the
plaintiff or the defendant was a pro se party.77

76 It is important to note that, although this Comment is limited to analyzing suits
filed in federal district courts, a large volume of pro se litigation occurs in state courts.
Some specialized courts, such as those focused on domestic relations, have high portions
of their dockets devoted to pro se cases. However, many nonspecialized state courts also
have a significant volume of pro se cases. Further, many pro se litigants in federal district
courts appeal their cases, resulting in substantial pro se litigation in federal appellate
courts. For more discussion of pro se litigation throughout the US legal system, see generally, Stephan Landsman, The Growing Challenge of Pro Se Litigation, 13 Lewis & Clark
L Rev 439 (2009). For one example of pro se reform undertaken by specific state courts
and the effects of those reforms on litigation, see Eovaldi and Meyers, 72 Nw U L Rev at
975–78 (cited in note 4).
77 For more discussion of the nature of these fields and other data contained in the
AO dataset, see generally Integrated Data Base Civil Documentation (Federal Judicial
Center, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/LT4F-2W5E. Additionally, several other fields
are used in the data processing that is conducted before the analysis, such as using the
docket number assigned by the district court to avoid double-counting cases. For more
discussion of the data cleaning process, including the data used in that process, see
Appendix: AO Data Processing.
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TABLE 2A: NUMBER OF CASES FILED IN FEDERAL DISTRICT
COURTS, PRO SE VERSUS REPRESENTED LITIGANTS
’98–’01

’02–’05

’06–’09

’10–’13

Cases Per Year, thousands
Both Parties Represented

145

167

175

185

Pro Se Plaintiffs

15

17

18

21

Pro Se Defendants

3

4

4

5

% Pro Se Plaintiffs

9.1%

9.0%

9.0%

9.8%

% Pro Se Defendants

1.9%

2.2%

1.9%

2.5%

As seen in Table 2A, civil nonprisoner pro se litigation appears to comprise a stable proportion of federal district courts’
dockets.78 Averaged over several four-year time periods, the percentage of cases in federal district courts that were filed by pro se
plaintiffs has ranged only from 9 to 10 percent. However, that still
constitutes an average of more than fifteen thousand federal district court cases each year involving nonprisoner pro se plaintiffs.
Similarly, the percentage of cases that have been answered by pro
se defendants has hovered around 2 percent.
Commentators writing about pro se litigation over the past
twenty years have typically described pro se litigation as a large
and growing portion of the federal docket.79 However, when the
scope of the inquiry is limited to nonprisoner pro se litigation, this
trend does not show up in the AO data. There has been a meaningful upward trend in the total number of pro se cases. But the
percent of cases brought by pro se plaintiffs has not changed significantly, as seen in Table 2A, suggesting pro se litigation comprises a relatively stable portion of the federal docket.
The exclusion of prisoner pro se litigation is a potentially consequential choice. Commentators sometimes discuss trends in
prisoner and nonprisoner civil pro se litigation without differentiating between the two classes, but there is no reason to assume
that trends in prisoner pro se litigation mirror trends in

78 Civil pro se litigation by prisoners is heavily concentrated in two pseudocriminal
types of proceedings: prisoner habeas corpus petitions (nature of suit code 530) and prisoner civil rights petitions (nature of suit code 550). For a more detailed description of these
fields, see generally Integrated Data Base Civil Documentation (cited in note 77).
79 See, for example, Landsman, 13 Lewis & Clark L Rev at 441–42 (cited in note 76).
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nonprisoner pro se litigation.80 Prisoner pro se litigation may be
an interesting topic of its own. However, most prisoner litigation
consists of several unique case types that are pseudocriminal in
nature, particularly habeas petitions, that are not necessarily
similar to other types of civil pro se litigation. Accordingly, the
scope of this Comment excludes cases that are predominantly
brought by prisoners in order to focus more narrowly on the dynamics of civil nonprisoner pro se litigation in federal district
courts.81
B.

Case Outcomes for Pro Se Litigants in Federal District
Courts

One of the most important aspects of pro se litigation in federal district courts is that pro se litigants fare extremely poorly.
This is generally understood in the literature.82 However, the
magnitude of the disparity between pro se and represented litigants is not always highlighted. Accordingly, this Section presents statistics on typical outcomes for represented and pro se litigants in trial. Tables 2.2 and 2.3 show the win rates of plaintiffs
and defendants in cases that reach a final judgment based on
whether both parties are represented, the plaintiff is proceeding
pro se, or the defendant is proceeding pro se.

80 There are many factors affecting trends in prisoner pro se litigation that likely do
not impact nonprisoner pro se litigation, such as the growth of the US prison population
and concerns about the particular conditions and resources available to prisoners. For one
discussion of prisoner pro se litigation, see generally Michael W. Martin, Foreword: Root
Causes of the Pro Se Prisoner Litigation Crisis, 80 Fordham L Rev 1219 (2011).
81 Some reasons that these reforms may impact prisoners differently from nonprisoners include: differences in the types of cases brought, potentially different access to legal
resources (depending on the availability of legal materials in prison), different judicial
attitudes toward prisoner and nonprisoner pro se litigants, or different levels of access to
counsel. Note that this Comment does not definitively suggest these reforms impact
nonprisoner and prisoner pro se litigants differently. Instead, it merely suggests there
may be differences and limits the scope of this analysis to nonprisoner pro se litigants.
82 See, for example, Landsman, 13 Lewis & Clark L Rev at 442 (cited in note 76).
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TABLE 2B: OUTCOMES OF CASES REACHING FINAL JUDGMENT,
PRO SE VERSUS REPRESENTED LITIGANTS, 1998–2017
Judgment For

Plaintiff
Pro Se

Defendant
Pro Se

Both
Represented

Plaintiff

3%

73%

42%

Defendant

82%

12%

42%

Both

1%

3%

4%

Missing/
Unknown

14%

12%

10%

TABLE 2C: OUTCOMES OF CASES REACHING FINAL JUDGMENT
FOR PLAINTIFF OR DEFENDANT, PRO SE VERSUS REPRESENTED
LITIGANTS, 1998–201783
Judgment For

Plaintiff
Pro Se

Defendant
Pro Se

Both
Represented

Plaintiff

4%

86%

51%

Defendant

96%

14%

49%

As Tables 2.2 and 2.3 demonstrate, the presence of a pro se
plaintiff or pro se defendant dramatically changes the dynamics
of litigation. When both parties are represented and there is a
recorded final judgment for either the plaintiff or the defendant,
the plaintiff and the defendant each win roughly 50 percent of the
time. When the plaintiff proceeds pro se, the plaintiff instead wins
about 4 percent of the time. When the defendant proceeds pro se,
the plaintiff wins 86 percent of the time. These differences are
stark. A represented defendant will nearly always prevail over a
pro se plaintiff in court. A represented plaintiff will win almost as
consistently against a pro se defendant.
Though dramatic, these numbers do not necessarily imply
that lack of access to counsel worsens case outcomes for pro se

83 Table 2C simply removes cases classified as “Missing/Unknown” or “Both” from
Table 2B and recalculates the percentages. All analyses of cases reaching final judgment
in this Comment focus on the subset of case dispositions that commonly reach final judgment. Cases dismissed for want of prosecution, that settle, or that otherwise do not typically receive entry of final judgment on resolution are excluded from these analyses. For
more discussion of the calculation methodology, see Appendix: AO Data Processing.
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litigants. There are a number of plausible explanations for low
win rates by pro se litigants even if pro se litigants are not disadvantaged in court. For instance, and likely most significantly, because lawyers frequently work on a contingency fee basis, a lawyer is more likely to agree to work on behalf of a plaintiff with a
strong case than a plaintiff with a weak case.84 The stronger the
plaintiff’s case, the higher the expected damages and expected
payout for the lawyer. Hence, it is less likely that strong cases
proceed pro se.
While the outcome gap between pro se and represented litigants does not necessarily prove that lack of access to counsel
causes poor case outcomes for pro se litigants, it is easy to see how
it motivates proponents of pro se court reforms or civil Gideon.
Table 2C suggests that, whenever one of the parties is proceeding
pro se, the likelihood that any final judgment will be registered
for the other party is overwhelming. If one believes that a meaningful portion of pro se litigants have important rights that they
are seeking to vindicate in court, it is likely they are not receiving
adequate remedies under the current legal system.85
C.

Types of Suits Brought by Pro Se Litigants

Another important aspect of pro se litigation to examine is
the types of suits regularly brought by pro se litigants. This
Section provides several tables that highlight the frequency of pro
se litigants across different types of legal claims and show which
specific case types most frequently feature pro se litigants. Despite the fact that roughly 10 percent of federal district court litigation involves a pro se plaintiff, some types of litigation very
rarely involve pro se plaintiffs, while other types of cases are
brought by pro se plaintiffs much more than 10 percent of the
time. The story is similar for pro se defendants, though the variation is less dramatic because pro se defendants comprise only 2
84 For one discussion of this phenomenon, see John Leubsdorf, The Contingency Factor in Attorney Fee Awards, 90 Yale L J 473, 475–82 (1981).
85 Although it’s difficult to pinpoint the factors most responsible for the unfavorable
outcomes for many or most pro se litigants, some issues that many district judges cite in
explaining the typical challenges of pro se litigants include: pro se plaintiffs’ lack of ability
to write legally comprehensible pleadings or submissions, lack of ability to respond to legal
motions in fruitful ways, lack of knowledge about relevant legal precedents, issues with
timeliness in the legal process, and failure to understand the legal consequences of their
actions. For a more complete list of issues that judges perceive pro se litigants face, see
Stienstra, Bataillon, and Cantone, Assistance to Pro Se Litigants in U.S. District Courts
at *21–23 (cited in note 11).
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percent of defendants in civil suits in federal district courts. Even
in light of this variance, pro se litigants comprise a significant
raw number of civil suits in all categories.
TABLE 2D: NUMBER OF CASES BY NATURE OF SUIT, PRO SE
VERSUS REPRESENTED LITIGANTS, 1998–2017
Suit Category

Total Cases

% Pro Se

Thousands

Plaintiff

Defendant

Products Liability

19.2

2%

0%

Civil Rights

17.9

32%

2%

Tort
Labor
Government
Contract
Employment
Discrimination
Statute
Asbestos
Insurance
Property
Financial
Administrative
Other
All

16.7
15.5
15.1
15.0
14.5

7%
3%
8%
4%
19%

1%
2%
2%
3%
0%

11.2
11.1
8.4
6.2
6.1
5.7
14.3
176.8

11%
1%
2%
13%
13%
8%
7%
9%

4%
0%
2%
12%
4%
3%
4%
2%

Table 2D shows the most common types of litigation in federal
district courts and the frequency with which each type of case involves a pro se plaintiff or defendant. Pro se plaintiffs bring a disproportionately large percent of civil rights and employment discrimination cases. In contrast, pro se plaintiffs rarely bring other
types of cases, such as products liability, contract, asbestos, and
insurance cases.86 Table 2D also shows that the only types of cases
that frequently involve pro se defendants are property cases, which

86 This is unsurprising given the large financial stakes often involved in those cases
and the prospective availability of contingency fees.

2018]

Empirical Patterns of Pro Se Litigation

1841

are primarily foreclosure proceedings.87 Perhaps the most important takeaway from Table 2D is that a substantial proportion
of many types of cases are brought by pro se plaintiffs. Though
there is significant variance—pro se litigants bring 32 percent of
civil rights cases but bring a more modest 8 percent of cases involving the government and 2 percent of insurance and product liability cases—pro se litigants are prevalent across many types of cases.
Any reforms targeting just one type of lawsuit cannot fully address
the scope of issues faced by pro se litigants.
Tables 2E and 2F, the final tables in this Part, examine how
win rates for pro se litigants vary across different types of cases.
The win ratios in Table 2E compare the probability of a plaintiff
winning when both parties are represented to the probability of a
plaintiff winning when the plaintiff is a pro se plaintiff but the
defendant is represented. In the column “Plaint Rep’d / Plaint Pro
Se,” the number 2.0 would mean that plaintiffs win twice as often
when both parties are represented as compared to cases in which
the plaintiff is pro se. The higher the number, the better represented litigants fare relative to pro se litigants.
Next, Table 2F compares the probability of a plaintiff winning when both parties are represented to the probability of a
plaintiff winning when the plaintiff is represented but the defendant is a pro se defendant. In the column, “Def Rep’d / Def Pro Se,”
the number 0.5 would mean that plaintiffs win half as often when
both parties are represented as compared to cases in which the
defendant is pro se. The lower the number, the better represented
litigants fare relative to pro se litigants.88

87 In fact, there is an upward trend over time in the percentage of property suits
involving a pro se defendant. Among property suits filed in district courts in 2016, 23 percent involved a pro se defendant (based on the data used in Table 2D).
88 There were no cases in the sample in which a defendant in an asbestos case proceeded on a pro se basis and the plaintiff won the case. Accordingly, “N/A” is recorded for
the numbers that would otherwise have this zero in the denominator.
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TABLE 2E: WIN RATES BY NATURE OF SUIT, PRO SE V
REPRESENTED PLAINTIFFS, 1998–2017
% Judgments for Plaintiffs
Suit
Category

Win Ratio

Cases Per
Year,
Thousands

Only
Plaint Pro
Se

Both
Rep’d

Plaint
Rep’d/Plaint
Pro Se

Products
Liability

19.2

5%

13%

2.5

Civil Rights

17.9

2%

18%

11.5

Tort
Labor
Government
Contract
Employment
Discrimination
Statute
Asbestos
Insurance
Property
Financial
Administrative
Other
All

16.7
15.5
15.1
15.0
14.5

3%
10%
9%
8%
2%

32%
76%
25%
69%
13%

9.8
8.0
2.7
8.8
6.6

11.2
11.1
8.4
6.2
6.1
5.7

5%
11%
3%
2%
9%
4%

64%
15%
43%
77%
49%
71%

13.1
1.4
13.3
42.1
5.3
16.2

14.3
176.8

8%
4%

77%
51%

9.9
13.7
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TABLE 2F: WIN RATES BY NATURE OF SUIT, PRO SE VERSUS
REPRESENTED DEFENDANTS, 1998–2017
% Judgments for Plaintiffs
Suit
Category

Win Ratio

Cases Per
Year,
Thousands

Only Def
Pro Se

Both
Rep’d

Def
Rep’d/Def
Pro Se

Products
Liability

19.2

82%

13%

0.2

Civil Rights

17.9

43%

18%

0.4

Tort
Labor
Government
Contract
Employment
Discrimination
Statute
Asbestos
Insurance
Property
Financial
Administrative
Other
All

16.7
15.5
15.1
15.0
14.5

67%
90%
84%
92%
61%

32%
76%
25%
69%
13%

0.5
0.8
0.3
0.8
0.2

11.2
11.1
8.4
6.2
6.1
5.7
14.3
176.8

89%
0%
67%
87%
9%
4%
93%
86%

64%
15%
43%
77%
49%
71%
77%
51%

0.7
N/A
0.6
0.9
0.6
0.8
0.8
0.6

Tables 2E and 2F show that there is considerable variance in
the outcomes of different types of cases for both represented and
pro se litigants. When plaintiffs proceed pro se, they win somewhere between 2 and 11 percent of cases, depending on the nature
of the suit. When the defendant is pro se and the plaintiff is represented, the plaintiff wins somewhere between 43 percent and
93 percent of cases,89 depending on the nature of the suit. This
substantial variance is not confined to pro se litigants. Even when
both parties are represented, there is wide variance in the percentages of cases won by plaintiffs, ranging from just 13 percent
in products liability and employment discrimination cases to 77

89 With the exception of asbestos litigation. However, there were only two asbestos
cases in the sample with pro se defendants.
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percent in property cases.90 But in essentially all categories, pro
se litigants fare far worse than represented litigants.
The relative win ratios tell a similar story. There is wide variance based on the type of lawsuit being brought, but represented
litigants consistently have far better outcomes than pro se litigants in court. When both parties are represented, plaintiffs win
at a rate between 1.4 and 42.1 times as often as when only the
defendant is represented. By contrast, a represented plaintiff is
roughly 0.2 to 0.9 times as likely to win a case against a represented defendant as against a pro se defendant.91
As Table 2D shows, pro se litigation comprises a significant
fraction of almost all types of lawsuits in federal district courts.
And as seen in Tables 2E and 2F, across essentially all of those
lawsuits, pro se litigants fare dramatically worse than their represented counterparts.
III. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF PRO SE REFORM
This Part presents an empirical analysis of pro se reforms
made in federal district courts. It compares outcomes for pro se
litigants in courts that have implemented reforms with outcomes
for pro se litigants in courts that have not implemented reforms.
The analysis discovers that outcomes are not substantially different in courts that have made these reforms. Hence, this Part suggests that pro se reforms in federal district courts have not impacted outcomes of pro se litigation despite evidence that clerks
and judges in those courts believe the reforms are effective at
achieving this goal.
A.

Discussion of Data

The analysis in this Part draws upon two different sources of
data. The first data source is the same dataset used for the
analysis in Part II: the AO Dataset containing civil cases filed in
US district courts.

90 The low percentages here may reflect high settlement rates for strong products
liability or asbestos cases so that many cases that plaintiffs would win instead settle.
91 Property cases are an interesting exception, with a represented plaintiff still 0.88
times as likely to win a case against a represented litigant as against a pro se defendant.
Though the noncausal nature of the comparisons weighs against drawing any overly significant inferences from this fact, it does suggest that the trend toward increasing numbers of defendants proceeding pro se in property suits might not be a particularly important issue.
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The second data source for this analysis is the 2011 FJC
Survey.92 The survey administrators sent two separate questionnaires to US federal district courts: one for clerks of the court and
one for chief judges. Ninety US district courts responded to the
questionnaire directed to clerks of the court. This analysis draws
upon those responses.93
One part of that questionnaire focused on the procedural
steps that clerks’ offices took to assist pro se litigants, either
through programs and procedures or efforts to improve access to
counsel. The survey asked about eighteen different services, programs, or procedures that at least some district courts have implemented to assist nonprisoner pro se litigants.94 The appendix
to that survey describes which of the responding district courts
had implemented those policies as of the survey date for fifteen of
those eighteen policies.95
There are several important limitations to using this data.
First, the exact date of the survey is unclear and, relatedly, the
exact dates that each district court responded that it was employing or not employing these procedures is uncertain. The analysis
is conducted using cases filed between 2008 and 2010. Accordingly, if a large number of district courts altered their policies
shortly before this survey was conducted or if the survey was conducted substantially before the survey was published, it’s possible
that this analysis would undercount the effects of those policies.
In either of those scenarios, the full consequences of these reforms
might not be seen in the 2008–2010 data sample. However, there
is no information suggesting that either possibility is reflected in
reality. Courts and commentators have been discussing and attempting to solve the challenges of pro se litigation for decades

92

See note 64 and accompanying text.
The questionnaire directed to chief judges did not include comparable questions
about policies that district courts have implemented to assist nonprisoner pro se litigants.
94 See the policies listed in Tables 1 and 2 of Stienstra, Bataillon, and Cantone, Assistance to Pro Se Litigants in U.S. District Courts at *2–3 (cited in note 11). Note that
there are two additional policies in those tables that are only for prisoner, as opposed to
nonprisoner, pro se litigants and thus are excluded from this analysis.
95 Data is unavailable for three policies: procedural assistance by clerk’s office staff
members as part of their regular duties, appointment of counsel to represent a pro se litigant for the full case, and appointment of counsel to represent a pro se litigant in limited
circumstances. See id. Although it would be interesting to conduct an analysis similar to
that conducted in the following Section for each of these policies, there is no obvious reason
that the absence of this data would undermine any of the following results beyond the fact
that an analysis similar to that conducted below could conceivably come to different conclusions for those policies.
93
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and implementing reforms for at least a decade; it seems unlikely
that they all started implementing these solutions immediately
prior to the survey.96
More generally, win rates are an imperfect outcome variable
for evaluating the effectiveness of pro se reform, and some caution
is warranted when making inferences based on this analysis. The
thorniest issue is that a large portion of civil cases are disposed of
in ways that do not typically result in final judgments being entered, so win rates do not directly shed light on how pro se litigants fare in those cases. Some district court reforms might plausibly result in more favorable settlements for pro se litigants, and
thus improved outcomes for pro se litigants while not materially
affecting the win rates of pro se litigants upon final judgment.97
That said, there is a good theoretical reason to believe that win
rates upon final judgment correlate with the favorability of settlements: in typical litigation settings, if both parties have similar
beliefs about the probability of winning at trial and make economically rational decisions, they ought to come to a settlement
weighted to favor the party more likely to prevail at trial.98 The
AO data, however, does not include any measure of settlement
quality that could be used to confirm or analyze the relationship
for these types of cases.
Additionally, there is no obvious way to test the consistency
or validity of these survey results. If different courts implemented
substantively different reforms but mapped them to the same policies when answering the questionnaire, these results may underestimate the effectiveness of certain policies. For example, if one
district court allowed pro se litigants to conduct extremely formal
and limited communications with pro se clerks, while another district court allowed pro se litigants who showed up at the court to
receive extensive counseling from pro se clerks, both district
courts may report that they provided “direct communications

96 For a discussion from the early 2000s, see Bloom and Hershkoff, 16 Notre Dame J
L, Ethics & Pub Pol at 488–97 (cited in note 74). To the extent that this is a risk, a followup study could be conducted by surveying the current practices of district courts and then
using a similar method to the one employed in this Comment to check whether differences
in current district court practices are impacting more recent outcomes for pro se litigants.
97 Conceivably, these reforms could even adversely affect win rates by convincing pro
se litigants with strong cases to accept favorable settlements.
98 See, for example, J.J. Prescott and Kathryn E. Spier, A Comprehensive Theory of
Civil Settlement, 91 NYU L Rev 59, 60–61 (2016).
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with pro se clerks.”99 These two policies may be sufficiently distinct that they have very different influences on the outcomes of
pro se litigation. The available survey data does not provide a reliable way to tease out these types of distinctions, and they are
grouped together in the analysis below. Similarly, if overburdened district courts were simply sloppy in their survey responses, this methodology may in turn underestimate the results
of these policies.
Although this analysis focuses on case outcomes, those are by
no means the only potential metric for analyzing the impact of pro
se reforms. Another relevant, tangible measure is the length of
proceedings. Pro se reforms have the potential to greatly expedite
pro se proceedings, helping to ensure that litigants are able to
move on with their lives as quickly as possible. Shortened
proceedings are valuable in their own right without impacting
case outcomes. Less tangibly, it may be the case that pro se
reforms improve the litigation experience for pro se litigants and
help ensure that they feel they have had a fair hearing in court.
Increasing satisfaction with court proceedings is a significant
benefit to litigants and also boosts the public perception of the
legal system—both valuable outcomes that would not show up in
the analysis below.100
Although case outcomes do not encompass all relevant information in assessing the impact or value of pro se reforms, they
are nonetheless an important metric to consider. Lawyers are
supposed to help their clients win cases. Accordingly, the viability
of pro se reform as a substitute for better access to counsel should
hinge in large part on its effectiveness at helping pro se litigants
win those cases. Moreover, case outcomes are the typical metric
that commentators consider when measuring the value of access
to counsel to pro se litigants.101 Hence, when evaluating the
tradeoffs of expanding pro se reform against expanding access to
counsel, case outcomes are one of the most natural and salient
measures.

99 See Table 1 in Stienstra, Bataillon, and Cantone, Assistance to Pro Se Litigants in
U.S. District Courts at *2 (cited in note 11).
100 For one discussion of potential benefits of litigation aside from the possibility of
winning cases, see Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Pseudonymous Litigation, 77 U Chi L Rev 1239,
1251 (2010).
101 See notes 53–59 and accompanying text.
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Methodology

The following Section conducts analysis aimed at evaluating
the effectiveness of pro se reforms undertaken by district courts
and reported in the FJC Survey. The outcome variable is the rate
at which judgments are entered in favor of the plaintiff for the
types of case dispositions in which final judgments are commonly
entered.102
The analysis compares differences in case outcomes in different sets of district courts. The sets are determined either by
whether the district court adopted a particular pro se reform or
by the total number of reforms the district court has adopted. By
comparing these results, this Part attempts to determine the effectiveness of these reforms.
Unfortunately for this empirical exercise, district courts do
not randomly decide whether to implement a particular reform.
If these pro se reforms had been randomly assigned, then this
analysis would mimic an experiment, and it would be safer to conclude (provided the statistics suggested so) that any differences
in case outcomes shown in the tables below were causal. Without
random assignment of pro se reforms to district courts, the conclusions of this analysis may suffer from selection bias. For example, courts that are particularly favorable to pro se litigants might
also be more likely to implement reforms. If pro se litigants happened to fare better in these courts, it would be difficult to empirically discern whether litigants fare better because of the reforms
or the favorable attitude, and some measure of the district court’s
favorability toward pro se litigants could be an important omitted
variable.
There is good reason to believe, however, that there are not
major omitted variable issues in this data. There are three potential omitted variables that are important to address here, but
none seems likely to be a confounding factor in this analysis.103
102 The types of cases that typically result in final judgment, and are evaluated here,
are cases that are disposed of following judgment on default, consent, motion before trial,
jury verdict, directed verdict, court trial, arbitral award, or other resolution. Cases disposed of via transfer or remand or dismissed due to settlement, voluntary dismissal, lack
of jurisdiction, or want of prosecution are discarded in this analysis.
103 The concern with omitted variable bias is that some other variable not included in
the model explains both the independent and dependent variable in the model. For example, in this case there could be an “omitted variable” measuring how much courts care
about protecting pro se litigants. A court with judges who care a lot about protecting pro
se litigants may implement many pro se reforms and also have favorable case outcomes
for pro se litigants because the judges are favorable to pro se litigants. Though it is difficult
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One key possibility is that district courts that have implemented
more pro se reforms may differ from other district courts in that
they have dockets with more (or fewer) pro se litigants. However,
previous analysis suggests that is not the case.104 Another potentially important consideration is whether pro se reform is concentrated in a few district courts. But approximately 90 percent of
district courts have implemented at least some services for
nonprisoner pro se litigants, so this does not appear to be the case
either.105 Finally, it could be the case that district courts typically
implement either none or many of these reforms. However, similar numbers of district courts have implemented one, two, three,
and four programs and procedures to assist pro se litigants;106 accordingly, there is no apparent all-or-nothing problem either.107
While this Comment does not claim that these are all of the potentially important omitted variables,108 it does seem that district
court reform is a widespread practice used in different ways
throughout those courts, suggesting that it is ripe for the type of
analysis conducted here.109
The potential relevance of selection bias in this analysis
should also be addressed. As Part II discusses, selection bias can
likely explain a portion of the gap in case outcomes between pro

to rule out all omitted variables, in this case the widespread implementation of at least
some reforms, coupled with the significant variation in which and how many are implemented by each court, suggests this kind of omitted variable is unlikely. For more discussion of omitted variable bias, see generally Kevin A. Clarke, The Phantom Menace: Omitted Variable Bias in Econometric Research, 22 Conflict Mgmt & Peace Sci 341 (2005).
104 See Stienstra, Bataillon, and Cantone, Assistance to Pro Se Litigants in U.S.
District Courts at *3 (cited in note 11) (“[T]here appears to be no relationship between the
number of services offered to pro se litigants and the average number of pro se filings in
the district.”).
105 See id.
106 See id at *2.
107 Because almost all US district courts responded to the FJC Survey, there is no
selection bias related to which district courts responded to the FJC Survey either.
108 For example, it could be the case that there is some correlation between the types
of reforms implemented and the practices of the judges on the court. If one reform is particularly expensive or cumbersome, courts with judges that are favorably disposed toward
pro se litigants may be more likely to implement it.
109 It is worth noting that these reforms could produce unobservable benefits in a
number of ways. For example, as discussed previously, some district courts may be implementing these reforms differently in practice, and it may be the case that a few are successfully implementing the reforms, resulting in significant improvements to case outcomes for those courts but not enough improvement to show up in the overall numbers.
Alternately, it may be the case that one particular combination of reforms is especially
impactful. There is not enough data to fruitfully study all permutations of reforms. Still,
this analysis is revealing with respect to the cumulative effects of these reforms.
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se and represented litigants.110 However, as this Part discusses,
the relevant sample for comparison is the difference in case outcomes between pro se litigants in courts that have implemented
reforms and courts that have not implemented reforms. Thus, the
pro se cases in different district courts are similarly affected by
this selection bias. Litigants with weaker cases may be more
likely to proceed pro se in EDNY, but they are also more likely to
proceed pro se in the Southern District of New York (SDNY) or
the Northern District of Illinois. Accordingly, the cases being compared should presumably be similar in average strength, or at
least there is no reason to think this selection bias will result in
differences in average case strength for pro se litigants across different district courts. These selection bias issues result in a gap
in the average strength of cases brought by pro se litigants and
represented litigants, but they do not lead to a gap between the
average strength of cases brought by pro se litigants in two different district courts.111
C.

Empirical Results

In order to evaluate the effects of different pro se reform
measures undertaken by district courts, this Section compares
the win rates of pro se litigants in courts that have enacted each
of the reforms discussed in the FJC Survey with the win rates of
litigants in the districts that have not enacted those same reforms. Table 3A compares the win rates for plaintiffs in cases in
which both parties are represented with those in which either the
plaintiff or defendant is pro se based on whether the district court
employs a particular policy.

110

See note 84 and accompanying text.
For a discussion of this and other selection bias issues related to the nonrandom
assignment of which cases proceed pro se, see Greiner and Pattanayak, 121 Yale L J at
2188–95 (cited in note 52).
111
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TABLE 3A: INDIVIDUAL EFFECTIVENESS OF PRO SE ASSISTANCE
POLICIES FOR PRO SE PLAINTIFFS, MEASURED BY PLAINTIFF WIN
RATES, 2008–2010
% of Cases Won by Plaint

Policy

Both

Plaint

Rep’d

Pro Se

# Dis-

Uses

Uses

Differ-

tricts

Policy?

Policy?

ence

Using

with

Policy

Policy
Yes

No

Yes

No

Programs and Procedures to Assist Pro Se Litigants
Electronic filing through

36

47%

46%

3%

3%

0%

34

47%

46%

3%

4%

-1%

24

45%

47%

3%

3%

-1%

19

48%

46%

3%

3%

-1%

Mediation for pro se litigants

18

48%

46%

4%

3%

1%

Other

14

49%

46%

4%

3%

1%

CM/ECF
CM/ECF access to docket,
pleadings, etc.
Direct communication with
pro se clerk
Public info about pro se
programs

Services to Help Pro Se Litigants Obtain Representation
Bar-Maintained Pro Bono Panel

6

48%

46%

2%

3%

-1%

Listserv to Alert Bar of Need for

8

52%

46%

4%

3%

1%

20

44%

47%

3%

3%

-1%

24

51%

44%

3%

3%

0%

33

45%

48%

3%

3%

0%

32

46%

47%

4%

3%

0%

19

53%

44%

5%

3%

2%

13

53%

45%

5%

3%

2%

44

47%

46%

3%

4%

-1%

Representation
Court Pays Costs and Some
Attorneys’ Fees
Provision in Local Rules for
Payment of Costs
Handout about Low-Cost
Legal Services
Handout about Obtaining an
Attorney
Pro Bono Panel for Pro Se
Litigants
Local Rule Requiring Pro Bono
Service from Bar
Court Review to Determine
Need for Counsel
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Table 3A suggests that the various policies used to assist pro
se litigants in federal district courts have not substantially affected win rates for pro se plaintiffs. When both parties are represented, plaintiff win rates gravitate around 50 percent. When
only the plaintiff is pro se, the plaintiff win rate hovers between
2 and 5 percent. All of the policies registered in the FJC Survey
classified as “programs and procedures to assist pro se litigants”—the types of policies discussed throughout this
Comment—appear to have no more than a 1 percent impact on
the percent of pro se litigants that actually win cases in court.
Perhaps more likely, they do not actually impact case outcomes
at all, and the 1 percent variation is simply noise. Regardless of
whether they account for some small improvement, however,
these results show that pro se reforms are not significantly moving the needle in terms of case outcomes. Any potential improvement is substantially smaller than what the experimental literature suggests would result from improved access to counsel.112
Hence, compared to pro se win rates with a lawyer, these reforms
cannot be considered a meaningful substitute for access to counsel
even if they yield a small improvement, at least insofar as the goal
is to help pro se litigants win more cases.
In contrast, the results for services intended to help pro se
litigants obtain representation are somewhat less clear. Again,
the resultant “improvements” in win rates look more like statistical noise than meaningful impacts, but there is arguably more
room for contrary interpretations.113 However, while those reforms are no doubt also advocated by many seeking an alternative
to civil Gideon, they concern increased access to counsel instead
of substitutes for access to counsel. Thus, these kinds of reforms
do not resemble the types of reforms suggested by the Supreme
Court in Turner nor by most commentators discussing civil
Gideon alternatives.114

112

See notes 52–59 and accompanying text for discussion of the experimental results.
But note that represented litigants in courts that have implemented these reforms
also win cases 8 or 9 percent more frequently than they lose cases, so it’s plausible that
the courts that have implemented those reforms are just more plaintiff-friendly (or typically handle cases that favor plaintiffs) or that these differences reflect more noise than
signal. See Table 3A.
114 See text accompanying notes 41–45 and 66–67 for discussion of what Turner and
commentators have called for.
113
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TABLE 3B: INDIVIDUAL EFFECTIVENESS OF PRO SE ASSISTANCE
POLICIES, MEASURED BY PLAINTIFF WIN RATES, FOR PRO SE
DEFENDANTS, 2008–2010
% of Cases Won by Plaint
Both

Def Pro Se

Rep’d
Policy

# Dis-

Uses

Uses

Differ-

tricts

Policy?

Policy?

ence

Using

with

Policy

Policy
Yes

No

Yes

No

Programs and Procedures to Assist Pro Se Litigants
Electronic filing through CM/ECF

36

47%

46%

82%

79%

-3%

CM/ECF access to docket,

34

47%

46%

82%

79%

-4%

24

45%

47%

82%

80%

-2%

Public info about pro se programs

19

48%

46%

81%

80%

-1%

Mediation for pro se litigants

18

48%

46%

82%

80%

-2%

Other

14

49%

46%

82%

80%

-2%

pleadings, etc.
Direct communication with pro se
clerk

Services to Help Pro Se Litigants Obtain Representation
Bar-Maintained Pro Bono Panel

6

48%

46%

80%

80%

1%

Listserv to Alert Bar of Need for

8

52%

46%

82%

80%

-2%

20

44%

47%

80%

81%

1%

24

51%

44%

80%

81%

0%

33

45%

48%

81%

80%

-1%

32

46%

47%

81%

80%

-1%

Pro Bono Panel for Pro Se Litigants

19

53%

44%

80%

81%

1%

Local Rule Requiring Pro Bono

13

53%

45%

82%

80%

-2%

44

47%

46%

82%

79%

-2%

Representation
Court Pays Costs and Some
Attorneys’ Fees
Provision in Local Rules for
Payment of Costs
Handout about Low-Cost Legal
Services
Handout about Obtaining an
Attorney

Service from Bar
Court Review to Determine
Need for Counsel

Table 3B looks at the same questions for pro se defendants,
and it tells the same story as Table 3A. Pro se defendants do not
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reap any more benefits in terms of case outcomes from pro se reform than pro se plaintiffs. At least for the reforms considered in
the FJC Survey, none seems individually effective.
Table 3C relies on the same data but considers the win rates
of different types of litigants based on the total number of policies
that the district court has implemented rather than which particular policies the court has implemented. Table 3C thus seeks to
test the slightly different hypothesis that there may be a cumulative benefit from implementing these policies even if none is individually impactful.
TABLE 3C: AGGREGATE EFFECTIVENESS OF PRO SE ASSISTANCE
POLICIES, MEASURED BY PLAINTIFF WIN RATES
Number of Policies Used by
District Court

% of Cases Won by Plaintiff

Both Rep’d

Plaint Pro Se

Def Pro Se

Programs and Procedures to Assist Pro Se Litigants
Zero Policies

43%

3%

76%

One Policy

49%

4%

82%

Two Policies
Three Policies
Four Policies
Five Policies

47%
46%
48%
40%

4%
3%
3%
2%

83%
82%
82%
71%

Services to Help Pro Se Litigants Obtain Representation
Zero Policies
One Policy
Two Policies
Three Policies
Four Policies
Five Policies
Six Policies

41%
46%
41%
51%
52%
45%
54%

2%
4%
2%
4%
4%
3%
3%

77%
79%
82%
83%
81%
77%
81%

Overall Average
46%

3%

80%

Table 3C tells a similar story as Tables 3A and 3B. Although
there is some variation in the win rates, there is no discernable
pattern. Pro se litigants do not consistently have better case outcomes in districts that have implemented more policies aimed at
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improving the lot of pro se litigants. Instead, the win rates of pro
se litigants deviate only a couple of percentage points from the
overall average win rates for pro se litigants even in districts that
have implemented three, four, or more of the policies considered
in this Comment.
Overall, the analysis in this Section suggests that, though
many federal district courts have implemented reforms aimed at
improving case outcomes for pro se litigants, they have not yet
succeeded in improving those outcomes. Tables 3A and 3B suggest that a variety of policies, each implemented in a substantial
number of district courts, have all been ineffective in improving
case outcomes for pro se litigants. Similarly, the evidence suggests that even courts that have implemented multiple or many
of these policies have not improved outcomes for pro se litigants
thus far. Despite the belief expressed by clerks’ offices and chief
judges of federal district courts, commentators, and the Supreme
Court that these types of measures are effective, the empirical
evidence suggests that these measures make no difference in case
outcomes.115
IV. CASE STUDY: PRO SE REFORM IN EDNY
This Part focuses on an extensive set of pro se reforms made
in the federal district court in EDNY. Because these reforms were
publicly announced around the time of their implementation, this
Part conducts a difference-in-differences analysis of these reforms
to complement the differences analysis from Part III.116 This
analysis strengthens the results in Part III, suggesting that pro
se reforms have not impacted case outcomes for pro se litigants.

115 At least insofar as these reforms are designed to substitute for additional access
to counsel and help pro se litigants win more cases. As discussed previously, the fact that
these reforms have not improved case outcomes does not imply that these reforms have
not positively impacted other aspects of pro se litigation.
116 A difference-in-differences analysis is an analysis that looks at two samples (here,
EDNY pro se litigant outcomes and non-EDNY pro se litigant outcomes) and compares the
difference in the average result between those two groups before and after a treatment.
This analysis compares the difference between EDNY and non-EDNY pro se litigant outcomes before the pro se reform with the difference between EDNY and non-EDNY pro se
litigant outcomes after the pro se reform. Non-EDNY in this analysis refers to all New
York federal district courts other than EDNY: the Northern District of New York, SDNY,
and Western District of New York. The treatment effect is the difference between these
two differences—that is, the difference in differences. For more discussion of this methodology, see generally Marianne Bertrand, Esther Duflo, and Sendhil Mullainathan, How
Much Should We Trust Differences-in-Differences Estimates?, 119 Q J Econ 249 (2004).
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Background on EDNY Pro Se Reform

In May 2001, EDNY began one of the country’s more dramatic pro se reform programs, elevating a magistrate judge to a
newly created pro se office focused entirely on overseeing pro se
litigation and assigning her broad responsibilities for overseeing
pro se litigation.117 These reforms were implemented with the intent to help “facilitate access to the courts” for pro se litigants.118
The EDNY pro se office has two primary functions.119 First,
the magistrate judge’s pro se office—comprised of staff attorneys
and administrative office employees—proposes initial orders to
the assigned judge, including to dismiss or to direct the litigant to
amend the complaint, and responds to inquiries from the judge’s
offices about the cases. As part of these initial duties, the office
gives procedural advice to individuals about filing and litigating
their claims by answering questions and making forms and instructions available. Second, the magistrate judge automatically
oversees all pro se cases that survive screening, handles pretrial
matters, and presides at trial with the parties’ consent.120 These
reforms do not exactly mimic those discussed in the FJC Survey
and evaluated in the empirical analysis above. However, they do
include a number of efforts similar to those evaluated in
Table 3B—providing forms and handbooks as well as individual
case assistance, for instance. Because this reform effort is different from those that Part III discusses, it’s hard to directly compare them. But both sets of reforms fit into a similar broad bucket:
attempts by courts to improve the pro se litigation process by facilitating simpler and more convenient interactions between pro
se litigants and the courts.
Although EDNY created this office partially in response to the
growth of pro se litigation in that district, its caseload appears
broadly representative of pro se litigation more generally as of
1999, shortly before the creation of the magistrate judge’s office.121
117 Bloom and Hershkoff, 16 Notre Dame J L, Ethics & Pub Pol at 476–77 (cited in
note 74).
118 Id at 477.
119 See id at 496–97 (discussing in more detail how pro se litigation is handled in EDNY).
120 Id at 496. The only exceptions to the practice of sending all screened pro se cases
to the magistrate judge are for Social Security appeals and federal prisoner petitions seeking habeas corpus relief. Id.
121 See Bloom and Hershkoff, 16 Notre Dame J L, Ethics & Pub Pol at 493–94 (cited
in note 74). About 15 percent of civil cases were pro se cases in 1999, and a substantial
percentage of those cases were prisoner pro se cases, so the percent of the docket comprised
of nonprisoner pro se cases was relatively close to the typical 9 percent of the federal docket
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The concerns that led to EDNY’s decision to appoint this special
magistrate judge—the difficulty of fairly and efficiently managing
the large pro se docket and the need for specialized resources to do
so—seem to echo the same primary concerns that other courts and
commentators have expressed about the pro se litigation process.122
To date, a public, empirical assessment of the effects of this
office on outcomes of pro se litigation is not available. This Part
seeks to begin to fill that gap by evaluating the impact of EDNY’s
reforms on the pro se process. Part IV.B discusses the methodology for this analysis. Part IV.C finds that the reforms in the
EDNY have had a small, and in fact negative, impact on the win
rates of pro se litigants in that court.123 This evidence, when combined with the evidence in Part III, strengthens this Comment’s
finding that pro se reforms in trial courts have been ineffectual at
improving litigation outcomes for pro se litigants.
It is important to note that the reforms EDNY implemented
in 2001 were intended as a first step in an effort toward improving
the process of pro se litigation. Moreover, the office has had more
than ten years to continue innovating and revising its policy and
procedures, but none of those efforts would show up in this
analysis.124 The analysis below attempts only to assess the impact
of the creation of the pro se office over its first five years of existence. Specific information about subsequent reforms implemented by the office is not readily available and hence not ripe
for analysis. However, any such reforms may have had a different
for the time period that Table 2A covers. Further, the bulk of those cases were civil rights
cases, employment discrimination cases, and Social Security cases. The former two categories are also the most typical types of nonprisoner pro se litigation in this analysis, as
Table 2D shows.
122 Id at 495.
123 Note that this does not necessarily imply the pro se reforms in EDNY are failing
to improve the litigation process for pro se litigants. See notes 97–100 and accompanying
text. It is conceivable that, for example, the reforms in EDNY have led to higher average
settlement values for pro se plaintiffs and thus improved overall outcomes for pro se litigants. Moreover, there could be important benefits to a litigation process in which pro se
litigants feel more fully heard and in which the process is more dignified for pro se litigants. This office could be creating large benefits for pro se litigants in EDNY overall.
However, this analysis is restricted to case outcomes. Further, the pro se reforms in EDNY
may be making a positive impact in terms of the efficiency side of the equation, helping to
dispose of pro se cases more quickly and efficiently than would otherwise be the case and
reducing the overall burden of pro se cases on the court despite not improving case outcomes for pro se litigants.
124 In 2002, Magistrate Judge Lois Bloom of the pro se office cowrote an article making it clear that the office was intended as an imperfect step toward addressing the problem with the intention of adapting the institution over time. See Bloom and Hershkoff, 16
Notre Dame J L, Ethics & Pub Pol at 517 (cited in note 74).
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impact on case outcomes for pro se litigants and, accordingly, may
indicate more promising future directions for pro se reform.
B.

Methodology

In order to evaluate the impact of EDNY’s pro se reforms, this
Comment runs a logistic regression using whether the plaintiff
won the case as the independent variable. The dataset for this
regression is all cases decided in the four New York district courts
between 1998 and 2007 that involved pro se plaintiffs and represented defendants. This dataset includes 578 cases from the
Northern District of New York (NDNY), 2,658 cases from EDNY,
3,843 cases from SDNY, and 668 cases from the Western District
of New York (WDNY). The key variable of interest is a binary variable that is coded “1” if the case is in EDNY and filed after the
implementation of the pro se reforms and “0” otherwise.125 There
were 1,408 cases in this dataset from after EDNY implemented
the reforms.
There are a few potential omitted variables that this analysis
is unable to capture. One possible issue is changing caseloads in
each district over time. If the composition of EDNY’s pro se docket
shifted in a different way than New York’s other district courts in
the years surrounding the reform, that may hide the impact of
EDNY’s reforms. Another possibility is that noncourt legal actors
may have changed their strategies in response to EDNY reforms.
If, for example, outside legal aid clinics started shifting their resources to non-EDNY courts in response to this reform, possibly
because those clinics knew that pro se litigants would receive adequate assistance in EDNY due to the reforms, that may also
mask the impact of these reforms in EDNY. Finally, because this
analysis compares the outcomes of pro se litigation in EDNY with
outcomes of pro se litigation in the other New York district courts,
if those district courts also made improvements to the pro se litigation process during this time period, the analysis might understate the effect of the EDNY reforms.
The regression is run with five different sets of specifications.
The first regresses outcomes against a dummy for whether the
125 Although the reform was implemented in May 2001, this Comment codes this variable to 1 only for all cases filed in 2002 and after. The theoretical reason for this is to give
the reform the benefit of the doubt; it may have had an effect, but that effect may appear
only after it was integrated into EDNY’s normal pro se proceedings. In practice, the regression results do not meaningfully change if this variable is set to “1” for all cases filed
in May 2001 and after.
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case took place with EDNY reform; the second model adds a
dummy variable indicating whether each case took place in
EDNY; the third model adds dummy variables indicating which
district court each case was filed in; the fourth adds dummy variables for the year the case was filed (but removes the district
dummy variables); and the fifth model includes dummy variables
for both the year and district for each case.126
By selecting the time period from 1998 to 2007, this dataset
includes a symmetrical five years of cases from prior to the
implementation of the reform (1998–2002) and five years
afterward (2003–2007). Although the specific choice of five years
is arbitrary, the essential results are robust to the length of time
analyzed.127
C.

Empirical Results

From an initial look at Figure 1, no meaningful change in the
outcomes of pro se litigation in EDNY appears in the years following the creation of the pro se magistrate’s office. Instead, for
all district courts in the New York area, there is seemingly considerable variance in case outcomes on a yearly basis, with pro se
litigants performing very similarly on average in both sets of districts before and after the pro se reform. However, Figure 1 does
reflect the possibility that the percent of cases won by pro se
plaintiffs in the other New York district courts trended downward
more than in EDNY. But this is uncertain. With the exception of
1999, the win rates of pro se litigants are relatively similar in
EDNY to New York’s other district courts.

126 A dummy variable is a variable that takes a value of either 0 or 1 to indicate
whether data falls within a certain category. This enables regressions to capture the impact of non-numeric qualitative data.
127 The estimated coefficients have the same signs and similar magnitudes, and 95
percent confidence intervals similarly exclude the possibility of a statistically significant
positive impact if a period of three or four years is considered instead of a five-year period.
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FIGURE 1: PERCENT OF CASES WON BY PRO SE PLAINTIFFS,
EDNY VERSUS NON-EDNY DISTRICT COURTS IN NY, 1998–2007
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From Figure 1, it’s difficult to tell whether there is a trend in
EDNY meaningfully different from the trend seen in other New
York district courts. To investigate this further, this Comment
runs the logistic regression described above. Table 4 displays the
results of that regression. Because the outcome variable is
whether a plaintiff wins or loses a particular case, and each of the
independent variables in this regression is a binary dummy variable, the coefficients describe the change in the probability of a
case outcome when the variable is set to 1 instead of 0. Hence, a
coefficient of 0.5 on the variable “EDNY Reform Dummy” would
imply that EDNY Reform increased the chances of a pro se plaintiff winning a case by 0.5 percent.
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TABLE 4: IMPACT OF EDNY PRO SE REFORMS ON PRO SE
PLAINTIFF WIN RATES, 1998–2007

EDNY
Reform
EDNY

EDNY
Reform
(1)

EDNY
Reform +
EDNY
Dummy
(2)

EDNY
Reform +
District
Dummies
(3)

EDNY
Reform +
Year
Dummies
(4)

EDNY
Reform +
District
Dummies
+ Year
Dummies
(5)

-0.36
(0.85)

-0.59
(1.54)
0.28
(0.83)

-0.59***
(0.16)
0.071
(0.13)
-1.30
(0.26)
-1.36
(0.29)
(X)

-0.015
(0.17)

0.04
(0.24)
-0.27
(0.22)
-1.32***
(0.22)
-1.40
(0.31)
0.00

(X)

(X)

-1.894***
(0)
7,747

-1.627***
-0.19
7,747

WDNY
NDNY
SDNY
Year
Dummies
Constant
Observations

-2.61
(-0.35)
7,747

-2.665
(-0.34)
7,747

-2.409***
(-0.11)
7,747

Note: ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05

Table 4 suggests that, like the other pro se reforms that
Part III considers, the pro se reforms in EDNY have not been effective in improving case outcomes for pro se litigants. The coefficient on the dummy variable indicating whether the EDNY pro
se reforms were instituted is -0.59, and the 95 percent confidence
interval suggests that there is some nonzero negative effect when
no controls are instituted in the first model in column one.128 The
results are similar for the second and third models except that,

128 However, this result is not robust against a different choice of years. For example,
while the point estimate is still negative, the 95 percent confidence interval for a regression run on data from 1999 through 2006 includes zero (though the 90 percent confidence
interval does not). Thus, the better takeaway at this point is not that the reform has had
a negative impact on win rates but that it has not had a significant positive impact on win
rates.
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once all districts are controlled for, the negative impact of the reform is statistically significant. When dummies are introduced
corresponding to the year of each case filing, this negative effect
disappears and the fourth and fifth models indicate no statistically significant impact from the reform. Including the full set of
controls for year and district, the 95 percent confidence interval
suggests that the reforms in EDNY had an impact of somewhere
between -0.43 percent and 0.51 percent on the win rates for pro
se litigants, with a statistically insignificant mean estimated impact of 0.04 percent.129 These results suggest that pro se reforms
were not effective at improving win rates for pro se litigants.
V. IMPLICATIONS
The empirical findings in Parts II, III, and IV have a number
of potentially important implications for the future of pro se litigation. However, before considering the policy implications, this
Comment must reiterate the limits of this analysis. First, this
analysis centers only on case outcomes. Further analysis—for example, a survey-based analysis that asks litigants how they feel
after they went through the litigation process—may reveal substantial benefits stemming from pro se reforms that this study
does not find. Second, this analysis shows only that the reforms
highlighted throughout this analysis have not impacted case outcomes for nonprisoner pro se litigants on average across courts.
However, it might be the case that certain courts have been much
more successful in implementing these reforms than others, and
this analysis masks those successes. Moreover, limitations on survey data, coupled with the fact that litigation frequently takes
years to resolve, mean that most of the data analyzed in this
Comment is five to ten years old. Courts may have developed
more promising innovations in the meantime, but this type of
analysis would not be able to detect those benefits until most or
all of the litigation begun in those years has run its course. Additionally, it’s possible that some of these reforms are significantly
impacting case outcomes for prisoner pro se litigants, which may
separately be an important goal of these reforms.

129 Running a linear, rather than logistic, regression—which may be more familiar to
some readers—with the same specifications, the confidence interval for the estimated impact of EDNY reform is from -0.05 to 0.06, with a statistically insignificant mean estimated
impact of 0.003 percent.
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One important takeaway from this Comment, related to the
limitations described above, is the importance of additional studies into the effectiveness of other reform measures, especially reform measures undertaken in courts other than federal district
courts. As previously mentioned, other courts throughout the
country have experimented with ways to help pro se litigants.130
Although the particular reforms analyzed here appear to have
been ineffective, other reforms undertaken by other courts might
achieve better results. With sufficient empirical legwork, successful reforms can be identified, and other courts can learn from
those successes. Although courts likely attempt to learn from each
other’s practices, without empirical validation of these techniques, there’s a risk that the blind are leading the blind. More
empirical studies could help show the way.
Additional studies that help determine the extent to which
differences in access to counsel are responsible for the gaps in case
outcomes between pro se and represented litigants, especially
across a broader range of types of cases, would also be useful. If
differences in access to counsel explain differences in case outcomes, the legal community should be more fearful that those
without adequate resources are being deprived of meaningful access to the legal system. Moreover, if communities that lack the
means to gain access to counsel lack effective legal recourse, despite sometimes having meritorious claims, then the legal community should also worry that bad actors can gain by depriving
those communities of legal rights without facing the deterrent effects of litigation. Concerns about exploitative employers may be
heightened if more than 2 percent of pro se plaintiffs have fully
meritorious claims but only 2 percent of those plaintiffs can effectively seek relief due to difficulties navigating the legal system.
Conversely, if lack of access to counsel does not explain poor case
outcomes for pro se litigants, perhaps the legal community should
focus on other considerations, such as making pro se litigants feel
that they have received a fair chance in court and had their grievances heard, rather than trying to narrow the gaps in case outcomes or provide lawyers for more pro se litigants.
Acknowledging the limits described above, this Comment
does find that pro se reform in federal district courts has not yet
meaningfully impacted case outcomes for pro se litigants,
whereas increased access to counsel has had somewhat more

130

See note 65.
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promising results in the experimental literature.131 The policy implications of those facts are not immediately clear. These results
suggest that increased access to counsel may help pro se litigants
vindicate rights; however, the wisdom of that approach depends
on whether the costs of that increased access to counsel outweigh
the benefits or whether there are cheaper ways to achieve those
benefits. One critical question in this vein is whether there are
more effective reform opportunities available to courts, because
more effective reforms could still conceivably enable improved
outcomes for pro se litigants at a lower cost than increased access
to counsel. This Comment finds little evidence that measures
thus far implemented by courts have improved case outcomes.
Hence, merely renewing and expanding similar reforms does not
appear to be an especially promising path forward.
One more effective path might look toward a growing body of
research on more effective ways to provide self-help resources and
literature to pro se litigants. A recent article by Professors
Greiner, Dalié Jiménez, and Lois R. Lupica details their endeavors to develop a theory of the issues that potential pro se civil litigants would face in the legal process. Their article then draws on
recent developments in a number of fields, such as education, psychology, and public health, to imagine what truly effective selfhelp materials would look like and how they might help pro se
litigants fare better at trial.132 Courts and commentators could try
to enhance the effectiveness of their reform efforts by drawing on
this and other similar research. Using this kind of research to
provide effective educational handbooks or to help courts communicate in ways that are more useful to pro se litigants could
enhance the types of pro se reforms analyzed in this Comment.
Finally, one other potential policy implication suggested by
this Comment is that expanded access to counsel for certain pro
se litigants may be an attractive option. This Comment does not
fully analyze the potential costs or benefits of civil Gideon and

131

See text accompanying notes 52–59.
See generally D. James Greiner, Dalié Jiménez, and Lois R. Lupica, Self-Help,
Reimagined, 92 Ind L J 1119 (2017). It is difficult to synthesize their conclusions into a
simple path toward providing pro se litigants with effective assistance, but they emphasize
in particular the need for breaking legal problems down into their constituent components,
including mental, psychological, and cognitive issues, as well as identifying and implementing relevant research from nonlegal literature to address those problems. They emphasize in particular that often the “relevant tasks have little to do with formal law.” Id
at 1172.
132
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accordingly comes to no conclusion about its overall merits.133
However, many commentators have opposed civil Gideon partially on the grounds that pro se reforms at the trial court level
could be a cheaper, but still effective, alternative.134 The Supreme
Court has suggested a similar belief.135 But while not totally conclusive for the reasons described above, this Comment indicates
that those reforms have not had the kind of impact on case outcomes that increased access to counsel might have. Because these
reforms do not yet appear to be a viable and effective alternative
to civil Gideon, this Comment suggests that improved case outcomes may be better achieved through expanded access to counsel
than through pro se reforms.
CONCLUSION
The challenges presented by the large volume of pro se cases
in federal district courts may require meaningful changes to
achieve a full resolution. In order to make headway on that front,
reformers must properly contextualize and understand the nature of pro se litigation in those courts and evaluate the successes
and failures of efforts that have been undertaken thus far.
This Comment presents commentators with a perspective on
the volume, types, and typical success rates of pro se litigants in
federal district courts. It shows that nonprisoner pro se litigants
comprise a meaningful percentage of the federal docket.
Moreover, pro se litigants show up in substantial numbers across
many different types of litigation, from property cases, to torts
cases, to civil rights cases. However, in nearly all of those types of
cases, pro se litigants fare at least several times worse than
represented litigants; overall, pro se plaintiffs are less than onetenth as likely to win cases as represented plaintiffs, whereas pro
se defendants are only about one-third as likely to win cases as
represented defendants.
133 For example, this Comment does not consider how many resources would be required to enact civil Gideon nor whether they could be better used elsewhere. It also does
not consider whether civil Gideon itself would be effective at improving civil pro se outcomes. While the experimental literature discussed earlier suggests that access to counsel
improves case outcomes for pro se litigants, it is unclear whether a similar quality of counsel would be provided in a civil Gideon world. Indeed, the success of Gideon in the criminal
context is a hotly debated subject, with many scholars considering it a disappointment.
For an example of a scholar who considers Gideon a disappointment, see generally Erwin
Chemerinsky, Lessons from Gideon, 122 Yale L J 2676 (2013).
134 See Part I.B.
135 See Turner, 564 US at 447–48.
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Moreover, this Comment assesses the effects of reforms in
federal district courts aimed at helping pro se litigants. It suggests that, despite widespread optimism from numerous stakeholders in the American legal community, reforms to federal district courts intended to improve the pro se litigation process have
thus far had a negligible impact on the outcomes of pro se litigation. If the goal is to improve case outcomes for pro se litigants, or
to replace the potential positive impact of increased access to
counsel at a lower cost, the types of reforms undertaken thus far
appear to have been unsuccessful.
APPENDIX: AO DATA PROCESSING
The AO dataset is created and made available through the
Federal Judicial Center.136 This Comment’s processing of the AO
dataset closely mirrors the processing implemented in other legal
scholarship.137 The dataset used in this analysis includes cases
terminated between June 1988 and June 2017 as well as pending
cases.
To process this dataset, first I eliminated all cases filed before
January 1, 1998; the analysis in this Comment considers only
cases filed after that date. After that, I dropped the following sets
of cases: all cases from non-Article III district courts; all cases
with a “local question” as the nature of the suit; all cases that are
currently still pending and lack a termination date; all cases that
have missing values for the case disposition; all observations that
have missing values for the nature of the suit; a variety of cases
that have a nature of suit variable indicating that the suits are of
a peculiar or inconsequential variety;138 certain categories of suits
that have the government as a party;139 and cases that are
136 See Civil Cases Filed, Terminated, and Pending from SY 1988 to Present (Federal
Judicial Center, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/Y4CY-MVG5. Note that the data is not
available for download from the Perma link. For the most recent data, see Civil Cases
Filed, Terminated, and Pending from SY 1988 to Present (Federal Judicial Center, 2018),
available at http://www.fjc.gov/research/idb/civil-cases-filed-terminated-and-pendingsy-1988-present (visited June 3, 2018). Note that the data used in this analysis was downloaded on October 3, 2017, and the data available through this link may have changed
since that date.
137 See, for example, William H.J. Hubbard, Testing for Change in Procedural Standards, with Application to Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 42 J Legal Stud 35, 61–63 (2013).
138 Case types 400, 520, 750, 810, 862, and 900. See Integrated Data Base Civil Documentation (cited in note 77). Note that several of these no longer are used. Code 900, for
example, pertains to appeals of (typically minor) court fees.
139 Case types 150, 151, 152, and 153 include, for example, suits brought by the government for recovery on defaulted student loans or reimbursements of overpayments by
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typically filed by prisoners and are considered “prisoner pro se
litigation.”140
In addition to dropping the above cases, I undertook a series
of steps to consolidate multiple records from certain cases and
prevent those cases from being double-counted. To do so, I first
created unique identifiers for each case based on the district, office, and docket number of its first filing. I then used those unique
identifiers to consolidate multiple records that correspond to the
same case into single records. I considered the filing date to be
the first date on which the case was filed and the termination date
to be the final date on which the case was terminated.
The AO dataset was created for administrative purposes rather than research, and the reliability of some of the fields kept
in the dataset can be uncertain, as shown in a 2003 study of the
AO dataset.141 However, this 2003 empirical analysis of the AO
dataset suggests that win rates, the key outcome variable used in
this analysis, can be deduced reliably from the AO dataset.142 That
2003 study concludes that when “judgment is entered for plaintiff
or defendant (at least in cases coded with nonzero-awards) the
reported victor is overwhelmingly accurate” and thus that analysis based on win rates in the AO dataset is appropriate.143

the government of veteran benefits or Medicare payments. See id. These types of cases
typically result in default.
140 The cases that are considered “prisoner pro se litigation” are those with a value of
510, 530, 535, 540, 550, and 555 in the nature of suit field, all of which are labeled as either
a type of “prisoner petition” or a habeas petition from someone facing the death penalty.
See id.
141 For a fuller discussion of the AO dataset’s reliability, see generally Theodore
Eisenberg and Margo Schlanger, The Reliability of the Administrative Office of the U.S.
Courts Database: An Initial Empirical Analysis, 78 Notre Dame L Rev 1455 (2003).
142 See id at 1489.
143 Id.

